## CTIDH: Faster constant-time CSIDH

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April 5, 2022

## CTIDH: Faster constant-time CSIDH

## CSIDH [CLM $\left.{ }^{+} 18\right]$

is a post-quantum isogeny-based non-interactive key exchange protocol.
It uses a group action on a certain set of elliptic curves.

- Secret keys sampled from some keyspace sk $\in \mathcal{K}$ give group elements,
- Public keys are elliptic curves obtained by evaluating the group action $\star$

$$
\mathrm{pk}=\mathrm{sk} \star \mathrm{E}
$$

is a new keyspace and a new constant-time algorithm for the group action in CSIDH.

- constant-time claims verified using
- speedups compared to previous best work:

438006 multiplications (best previous 789000)
125.53 million Skylake cycles (best previous more than 200 million)

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## CTIDH

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- constant-time claims verified using valgrind
- speedups compared to previous best work:

CSIDH-512: 438006 multiplications (best previous 789000)
125.53 million Skylake cycles (best previous more than 200 million).

## Today

1. CSIDH and the group action
2. Constant-time evaluation
3. Atomic blocks
4. New Keyspace
5. New algorithm and Matryoshka Isogeny

## Supersingular elliptic curves

Start with a prime $p=4 \cdot\left(\ell_{1} \cdots \cdots \ell_{n}\right)-1$ with $\ell_{1}, \ldots, \ell_{n}$ distinct odd primes.
Supersingular elliptic curves in Montgomery form
$E / \mathbb{F}_{p}$ supersingular elliptic curve with equation

$$
E_{A}: y^{2}=x^{3}+A x^{2}+x ;
$$

Set of elliptic curves $\mathcal{E}=\left\{E_{A}: y^{2}=x^{3}+A x^{2}+x\right.$ with $p+1$ points over $\left.\mathbb{F}_{p}\right\}$

## Properties

Abelian group with a algebraic group law,
Montgomery form enables $x$-only arithmetic
The group structure

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## Properties

$\checkmark$ Abelian group with a algebraic group law,
$\checkmark$ Montgomery form enables $x$-only arithmetic,
! The group structure

$$
E\left(\mathbb{F}_{p}\right) \cong \mathbb{Z} /(p+1) \mathbb{Z} \cong \mathbb{Z} / 4 \times \mathbb{Z} / \ell_{1} \times \cdots \times \mathbb{Z} / \ell_{n}
$$

## Isogenies

Whenever have a point $P \in E\left(\mathbb{F}_{p}\right)$ of order $\ell$, can construct an $\ell$-isogeny: a morphism of elliptic curves

$$
\varphi: E_{A} \rightarrow E_{A^{\prime}}
$$

with kernel $\langle P\rangle$.

## Unraveling the definition

- $\varphi$ is given by rational maps in the $x, y$ of $E$ with coefficient in $\mathbb{F}_{p}$;
- $\varphi$ is a group homomorphism: for all points $Q$ and $R$ we have

$$
\varphi(Q+R)=\varphi(Q)+\varphi(R)
$$

- the kernel of $\varphi$ is the subgroup of $E_{A}$ generated by $P$ and has size $\ell$;
! the isogeny acts like a "power- $\ell$-map" on $E\left(\mathbb{F}_{p}\right)$ : if $Q$ has order $\ell \cdot N$, then $\varphi(Q)$ has order $N$ on $E_{A^{\prime}}$


## Computing an isogeny from a point

Suppose $P \in E\left(\mathbb{F}_{p}\right)$ is a point of order $\ell$. Want to compute the isogeny with kernel $\langle P\rangle$ :

$$
\varphi: E_{A} \rightarrow E_{A^{\prime}}
$$

## Recipe

1. Collect the points $\{[i] P: i \in S\}$ for some index set $S$,
2. Compute the product

$$
h(X)=\prod_{i \in S}(x-x([i] P)),
$$

3. Recover $A^{\prime}$ from $h(X)$

- Vélu's formulas [Vél71] use $S=\left\{1,2, \ldots, \frac{\ell-1}{2}\right\}$;
cost $6 \ell$ mult
- New Vélu formulas [BDFLS20] use $S=\{1,3,5, \ldots, \ell-2\}$


## CSIDH magic

Prime $p=4 \cdot\left(\ell_{1} \ldots \ell_{n}\right)-1$,

$$
E_{A}\left(F_{p}\right) \simeq \mathbb{Z} / p+1
$$

set of elliptic curves $\mathcal{E}=\left\{E_{A}: y^{2}=x^{3}+A x^{2}+x\right.$ with $p+1$ points $\}$

## Every SEC has a distinguished $\ell_{i}$-isogeny

For every $E_{A} \in \mathcal{E}$ and every $\ell \mid p+1$, we can construct an $\ell$-isogeny $\varphi: E_{A} \rightarrow E_{A^{\prime}}$ using the points defined over $\mathbb{F}_{p}$ :

$$
E_{A} \longrightarrow E_{A^{\prime}}
$$

## Claim

We have $E_{A^{\prime}} \in \mathcal{E}$.

$$
\text { Gory li allows we to jurisp from } E_{A} \curvearrowright E_{A^{\prime}}
$$

## Group action

## Complex multiplication magic

There is a finite abelian group $G$ with a group action on $\mathcal{E}$ with the following properties:

- the action $E \mapsto g \star E$ is free and transitive action;

- for every $\ell_{i} \mid p+1$, there exists a group element $g_{i}$ such that if $\varphi: E_{A} \rightarrow E_{A^{\prime}}$ is the distinguished isogeny from before, then

$$
g_{i} \star E_{A}=E_{A^{\prime}}
$$

- It only matters how many times we step in a particular direction, not the order in which we compute the isogenies.


## Exponent vectors

## Going back with isogenies

For every curve in $\mathcal{E}$ and every $\ell_{i} \mid p+1$, we have one $\ell_{i}$-isogeny going forward, but also one going back:

$$
E_{A} \xrightarrow{g_{i}}{\underset{\sim}{A^{\prime}}}^{g_{i}^{-1}} E_{A}
$$

This isogeny also easy to compute.

## Exponent vector

$\left(e_{1}, \ldots, e_{n}\right) \in \mathbb{Z}^{n}$ encodes how many times we perform each isogeny.

$$
\left(e_{1}, \ldots, e_{n}\right): \quad E_{A^{\prime}}=\left(\prod_{i=1}^{n} g_{i}^{e_{i}}\right) \star E_{A} .
$$

## CSIDH key exchange

## Diffie-Hellman flow

Alice and Bob agree on a starting curve $E_{0} \in \mathcal{E}$ :

1. Alice samples random exponent vector ( $e_{i}$ ); Bob samples ( $f_{i}$ );
2. They compute action on $E_{0}$ as $E_{A}=\left(\Pi g_{i}^{e_{i}}\right) \star E_{0}$ and $E_{B}=\left(\Pi g_{i}^{t_{i}}\right) \star E_{0}$;
3. Exchange public keys: $E_{A}, E_{B}$;
4. They compute action on the curve just received:

$$
\left(\prod g_{i}^{e_{i}}\right) \star E_{B}=\left(\prod g_{i}^{e_{i}+f_{i}}\right) \star E_{0}=\left(\prod g_{i}^{t_{i}}\right) \star E_{A}
$$

## Constant-time evaluation

Secret keys $\left(e_{1}, \ldots, e_{n}\right) \in \mathbb{Z}^{n}$ used to evaluate the action

$$
E_{A^{\prime}}=\left(\prod_{i=1}^{n} g_{i}^{e_{i}}\right) \star E_{A}
$$

## Every step is:

1. finding a point of order $\ell$ on some curve $E \in \mathcal{E}$, 〔rougity the sation timu
2. an $\ell$-isogeny computation from $E$.


## Constant-time evaluation of the group action

If the input is a CSIDH curve and a private key, and the output is the result of the CSIDH action, then the algorithm time provides no information about the private key, and provides no information about the output.

## Computing the group action

## Computing one step

Simplified algorithm to compute the group action $E_{A^{\prime}}=g_{i} \star E_{A}$ as an $\ell_{i}$-isogeny:

1. find a point $P$ of order $\ell_{i}$ on $E_{A}$ :
1.1 generate a point $T$ of order $p+1$ on $E_{A}$,
1.2 multiply $P=\left[\frac{p+1}{\ell_{i}}\right] T . \rightarrow$ order $l . \approx 1 \mid \log _{2} \neq M$
2. Compute the $\ell_{i}$-isogeny $\varphi: E_{A} \rightarrow E_{A^{\prime}}$ with kernel $P$ :
2.1 enumerate the multiples $[i] P$ of the point $P$ for $i \in S$,
2.2 construct a polynomial $h(X)=\prod_{i \in S}(X-x([i] P))$,
2.3 Compute the coefficient $A^{\prime}$ from $h(X)$.

Weller frimuas
$\leqslant 687$

## Amortize the cost

## Exponent vector $(1,1,1,0, \ldots, 0)$

We compute $\ell_{i}$-isogenies for $\ell_{1}=3$ and $\ell_{2}=5$ and $\ell_{3}=7$ :

```
Find a suitable point:
1.1 Generate a random point T of order p+1
1.2 Compute }\mp@subsup{T}{1}{}=[\frac{p+1}{3.7}\rceilT\mathrm{ has exact order
Compute the isogenies
2.1 3-isogeny
    Compute P}\mp@subsup{P}{1}{}=[5\cdot7]T\mp@subsup{T}{1}{}\mathrm{ has order
    Use P}\mp@subsup{P}{1}{}\mathrm{ to construct 3-isogeny
    Point }\mp@subsup{T}{2}{}=\mp@subsup{\varphi}{1}{}(\mp@subsup{T}{1}{})\mathrm{ has order___ on the new curve,
2.2 5-isogeny:
    2.2.1 Compute }\mp@subsup{P}{2}{}=[7]\mp@subsup{T}{2}{}\mathrm{ has order
    2.2.2 Construct 5-isogeny }\mp@subsup{\varphi}{2}{}\mathrm{ with kernel }\mp@subsup{P}{2}{
    2.2.3 The point }\mp@subsup{T}{3}{}=\mp@subsup{\varphi}{2}{}(\mp@subsup{T}{2}{})\mathrm{ has order___on the new curve,
2.3 7-isogeny: construct the isogeny }\mp@subsup{\varphi}{3}{}\mathrm{ with kernel }\mp@subsup{P}{3}{}=\mp@subsup{T}{3}{}\mathrm{ which has order
```


## Amortize the cost

## Exponent vector $(1,1,1,0, \ldots, 0)$

We compute $\ell_{i}$-isogenies for $\ell_{1}=3$ and $\ell_{2}=5$ and $\ell_{3}=7$ :

1. Find a suitable point:

$$
p+1=4 \cdot(3 \cdot 5 \cdot 1 . \ldots)
$$

1.1 Generate a random point $T$ of order $p+1$,
1.2 Compute $T_{1}=\left[\frac{p+1}{3 \cdot 5 \cdot 7}\right] T$ has exact order $3 \cdot 5 \cdot 7$
2. Compute the isogenies:
2.1 3-isogeny:
2.1.1 Compute $P_{1}=[5 \cdot 7] T_{1}$ has order 3
2.1.2 Use $P_{1}$ to construct 3-isogeny $\varphi_{1}$,
2.1.3 Point $T_{2}=\varphi_{1}\left(T_{1}\right)$ has order 5 on the new curve,
2.2 5-isogeny:
2.2.1 Compute $P_{2}=[7] T_{2}$ has order 5 ,
2.2.2 Construct 5-isogeny $\varphi_{2}$ with kernel $P_{2}$,
2.2.3 The point $T_{3}=\varphi_{2}\left(T_{2}\right)$ has order $z^{2}$ on the new curve,
2.3 7-isogeny: construct the isogeny $\varphi_{3}$ with kernel $P_{3}=T_{3}$ which has order $\qquad$

## Towards atomic blocks

## Exponent vector ( $1,0,1,0, \ldots, 0$ )

We compute $\ell_{i}$-isogenies for $\ell_{1}=3$ and $\ell_{3}=7$ but no 5-isogeny:

1. Find a suitable point:
1.1 Generate a random point $T$ of order $p+1$,
1.2 Compute $T_{1}=\left[\frac{p+1}{3.5 \cdot 7}\right] T$ has exact order 3.5•7,
2. Compute the isogenies:
2.1 3-isogeny:
2.1.1 Compute $P_{1}=[5 \cdot 7] T_{1}$ has order 3,
2.1.2 Use $P_{1}$ to construct 3-isogeny $\varphi_{1}$,
2.1.3 Point $T_{2}=\varphi_{1}\left(T_{1}\right)$ has order $5 \cdot 7$ on the new curve,
2.2 No 5-isogeny:
2.2.1 Compute the isogeny as before but throw away the results,
2.2.2 Adjust to code to always compute [5] $T_{2}$,
2.2.3 The point $T_{3}=[5] T_{2}$ has order 7 on the same curve,
2.3 7-isogeny: construct the isogeny $\varphi_{3}$ with kernel $P_{3}=T_{3}$.

## Atomic blocks

## Definition (Atomic Blocks, simplified)

Let $I \subset\{1, \ldots, n\}$ be a subset of indices of size $k$, write $I=\left(i_{1}, \ldots, i_{k}\right)$.
An atomic block of length $k$ is a probabilistic algorithm $\alpha_{l}$ :

- taking inputs $A$ and $\epsilon \in\{0,1\}^{k}$,
- returning $A^{\prime} \in \mathbb{F}_{p}$ such that $E_{A^{\prime}}=\left(\prod_{j=1}^{k} g_{i_{j}}^{\epsilon_{j}}\right) \star E_{A}$,
- the time distribution of $\alpha_{l}$ is independent of $\epsilon$.


## Evaluating 3,5, and 7-isogeny

On the previous slide, we saw an atomic block $\alpha_{I}$ with $I=(1,2,3)$ that computes

$$
E_{A^{\prime}}=g_{1}^{\epsilon_{1}} g_{2}^{\epsilon_{2}} g_{3}^{\epsilon_{3}} \star E_{A}
$$

for $\left(\epsilon_{1}, \epsilon_{2}, \epsilon_{3}\right) \in\{0,1\}^{3}$ without leaking timing information about $\left(\epsilon_{1}, \epsilon_{2}, \epsilon_{3}\right)$.

## Why atomic blocks?

Definition (Atomic Blocks, simplified)
Let $I \subset\{1, \ldots, n\}$ be a subset of indices of size $k$, write $I=\left(i_{1}, \ldots, i_{k}\right)$.
An atomic block of length $k$ is a probabilistic algorithm $\alpha_{l}$ :

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- returning $A^{\prime} \in \mathbb{F}_{p}$ such that $E_{A^{\prime}}=\left(\prod_{j=1}^{k} g_{i_{j}}^{\epsilon_{j}}\right) \star E_{A}$,
- the time distribution of $\alpha_{l}$ is independent of $\epsilon$.


## Because:

1. Previous CSIDH implementations are using atomic blocks implicitly;
2. Simpler framework to compute the group action:
2.1 split the computation into atomic blocks independent of the secret;
2.2 make sure each atomic block is constant-time.

## Keyspace

## Goal

For $\left(e_{1}, \ldots, e_{n}\right) \in \mathbb{Z}^{n}$, evaluate the group action

$$
E_{A^{\prime}}=\left(\prod_{i=1}^{n} g_{i}^{e_{i}}\right) \star E_{A} .
$$

- Exponent vectors ( $e_{1}, \ldots, e_{n}$ ) sampled from some keyspace $\mathcal{K} \subset \mathbb{Z}^{n}$;
- Large enough keyspace: $\# \mathcal{K} \approx 2^{256}$;


## Examples of keyspaces

1. Original CSIDH [CLM $\left.{ }^{+} 18\right]:\left|e_{i}\right| \leq m$ for all $i$ with $(2 m+1)^{n} \approx 2^{256}$,
2. [MCR19] use $0 \leq e_{i} \leq 10$ for CSIDH-512;
3. [CDRH20] allow the $m_{i}$ to vary for efficiency.

## Batching

Take CSIDH-512 prime $p=4 \cdot(3 \cdot 5 \cdots \cdot 373 \cdot 587)-1$.

## The batching idea

Consider exponent vector

| primes | 3 | 5 | 7 | 11 | 13 | 17 | 19 | 23 | 29 | 31 | $\ldots$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| exponent vector | 1 | -2 | 0 | 3 | -1 | 1 | 0 | 2 | -1 | 0 | $\ldots$ |

$$
\left|a_{1}\right|+\left|\varepsilon_{2}\right|+\left|e_{3}\right| \leq 3
$$

$$
\mid \text { len }|+| \text { es }\left|+\left|e_{e}\right| \leq 5\right.
$$

New key space

Batching Keyspace
For $B$ batches: For $N \in \mathbb{Z}_{>0}^{B}$ and $m \in \mathbb{Z}_{\geq 0}^{B}$, we define

$$
\mathcal{K}_{N, m}:=\left\{\left(e_{1}, \ldots, e_{n}\right) \in \mathbb{Z}^{n}\left|\sum_{j=1}^{N_{i}}\right| e_{i, j} \mid \leq m_{i} \text { for } 1 \leq i \leq B\right\} .
$$

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \text { Comparison for } 6 \text { primes } \\
& \left(l_{1}, l_{2}, e_{3}, e_{4}, e_{5}, l_{6}\right) \\
& 20 \cdot 20=400 \\
& \left|e_{i}\right| \leq m_{i} \\
& 0 \leq l_{i} \text { filing to compute } \leq 3 \text { in Bats } 1 \\
& (2,2,3,3,3,3) \\
& \text { make sion ja always } \\
& \text { compute the save } \\
& 0 \subseteq e_{1}+e_{2}+e_{3} \leq 3 \rightarrow 20
\end{aligned}
$$

## Atomic blocks for batches

## Atomic blocks for batches

Suppose we have batches $\{3,5,7\},\{11,13,17\}, \ldots$. And we want to compute one 5 -isogeny and one 11 -isogeny, i.e. exponent vector ( $0,1,0,1,0,0,0, \ldots$ )

## Find a suitable point:

Generate a random point $T$ of order $p+1$
1.2 Compute $T_{1}=\left|\frac{p+1}{(3 \cdot 5 \cdot 7)(11 \cdot 13 \cdot 17)}\right| T$ has order
2. Compute the isogenies:


## Atomic blocks for batches

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Suppose we have batches $\{3,5,7\},\{11,13,17\}, \ldots$ And we want to compute one 5 -isogeny and one 11-isogeny, i.e. exponent vector ( $0,1,0,1,0,0,0, \ldots$ )

1. Find a suitable point:
1.1 Generate a random point $T$ of order $p+1$,
1.2 Compute $T_{1}=\left[\frac{p+1}{(3 \cdot 5 \cdot 7)(11 \cdot 13 \cdot 17)}\right] T$ has order (3.5 • 7)(11•13•17).
2. Compute the isogenies:
$2.1\{3,5,7\}$-isogeny:
2.1.1 Compute $P_{1}=[(11 \cdot 13 \cdot 17)] T_{1}$ has order (3.5 7),
2.1.2 Use [3.7] $P_{1}$ of order 5 to construct 5 -isogeny $\varphi_{1}$,
2.1.3 Point $T_{2}=[3 \cdot 7] \varphi_{1}\left(T_{1}\right)$ has order $11 \cdot 13 \cdot 17$ on the new curve,
2.2 \{11, 13, 17\}-isogeny:
2.2.1 Compute $P_{2}=[13 \cdot 17] T_{2}$ has order 11,
2.2.2 Construct 11-isogeny $\varphi_{2}$ with kernel $P_{2}$.

## Matryoskha isogeny

How to construct the isogeny with the same code for all primes in the batch:

## Matryoshka Isogeny for the batch $\{11,13,17\}$

Compute the 11-isogeny

1. enumerate the multiples $[i] P$ of the point $P$ for $i \in S$, with $S=\{1,2, \ldots, 5\}$
2. construct $h(X)=\prod_{i=1}^{5}(x-x([i] P))$,
3. Compute the coefficient $A^{\prime}$ from $h(X)$.

## Matryoskha isogeny

How to construct the isogeny with the same code for all primes in the batch:

## Matryoshka Isogeny for the batch $\{11,13,17\}$

Compute the 1113 -isogeny

1. enumerate the multiples $[i] P$ of the point $P$ for $i \in S$, with $S=\{1,2, \ldots, 5,6\}$
2. construct $h(X)=\prod_{i=1}^{5}(x-x([i] P)) \cdot(x-x([6] P))$,
3. Compute the coefficient $A^{\prime}$ from $h(X)$.

## Matryoskha isogeny

How to construct the isogeny with the same code for all primes in the batch:

## Matryoshka Isogeny for the batch $\{11,13,17\}$

Compute the 111317 -isogeny

1. enumerate the multiples $[i] P$ of the point $P$ for $i \in S$, with $S=\{1,2, \ldots, 5,6,7,8\}$
2. construct $h(X)=\prod_{i=1}^{5}(x-x([i] P)) \cdot(x-x([6] P)) \cdot(x-x([7] P))(x-x([8] P))$,
3. Compute the coefficient $A^{\prime}$ from $h(X)$.

## Matryoshka isogenies

## Matryoshka isogeny

- Compute the isogeny for any prime in the batch with the same code
- at the cost of computing isogeny for the largest prime,
- requires using dummy computations.

Known for Vélu formulas [BLMP19].
New for $\sqrt{ }$ élu from [BDFLS20], newly used for batching.

## Matryoshka for vêlu

The $\sqrt{ }$ élu polynomial
Want to evaluate

$$
h(X)=\prod_{i \in S}(x-x([i] P))
$$

for $S=\{1,3, \ldots, \ell-2\}$

## Visual explanation for 29 and 31

| 1 | 9 | 17 | 25 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 3 | 11 | 19 | 27 |
| 5 | 13 | 21 |  |
| 7 | 15 | 23 |  |

## Selection of the parameters

## Evaluation cost function

Greedy algorithm to find efficient batching:

- For every batch configuration (number of batches, bounds of each batch), we can estimate the cost of the group action evaluation.
- Adaptively change batch configuration to find one with smaller cost (and large enough keyspace).

| batch | size | primes | bound |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | 2 | 3,5 | 10 |
| 2 | 3 | $7,11,13$ | 14 |
| 3 | 4 | $17,19,23,29$ | 16 |
| 4 | 4 | $47,53,59,61,67$ | 17 |
| 5 | 5 | $71,73,79,83,89$ | 17 |
| 6 | 5 | $97,101,103,107,109,113$ | 17 |
| 7 | 6 | $127,131,137,139,149,151,157$ | 18 |
| 8 | 7 | $163,167,173,179,181,191,193$ | 18 |
| 9 | 7 | 587 |  |
| 10 | 8 | $197,199,211,223,227,229,233,239$ | 18 |
| 11 | 8 | $241,251,257,263,269,271,277,281$ | 18 |
| 12 | 6 | $283,293,307,311,313,317$ | 13 |
| 13 | 8 | $331,337,347,349,353,359,367,373$ | 13 |
| 14 | 1 | 587 |  |

## valgrind constant time verification

## Valgrind

Checking for constant-time

- We "poison" the secret data: declare undefined;
- valgrind will check if the undefined data corrupts branches or indices.


## Speedups, comparison to previous works

| pub | priv | DH | Mcyc | $\mathbf{M}$ | $\mathbf{S}$ | $\mathbf{a}$ | $1,1,0$ | $1,0.8,0.05$ |  |
| ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| 512 | 220 | 1 | 89.11 | 228780 | 82165 | 346798 | 310945 | 311852 | new |
| 512 | 220 | 1 | 190.92 | 447000 | 128000 | 626000 | 575000 | 580700 | [CCJR20] |
| 512 | 220 | 2 | 93.23 | 238538 | 87154 | 361964 | 325692 | 326359 | new |
| 512 | 256 | 1 | 125.53 | 321207 | 116798 | 482311 | 438006 | 438762 | new |
| 512 | 256 | 1 | - | 624000 | 165000 | 893000 | 789000 | 800650 | [ACR20] |
| 512 | 256 | 2 | 129.64 | 330966 | 121787 | 497476 | 452752 | 453269 | new |
| 512 | 256 | 2 | 218.42 | 665876 | 189377 | 691231 | 855253 | 851939 | [CDRH20] |
| 512 | 256 | 2 | 238.51 | 632444 | 209310 | 704576 | 841754 | 835121 | [HLKA20] |
| 512 | 256 | 2 | 239.00 | 657000 | 210000 | 691000 | 867000 | 859550 | [CCC ${ }^{+}$19] |
| 512 | 256 | 2 | - | 732966 | 243838 | 680801 | 976804 | 962076 | [OAYT19] |
| 512 | 256 | 2 | 395.00 | 1054000 | 410000 | 1053000 | 1464000 | 1434650 | [MCR19] |
| 1024 | 256 | 1 | 469.52 | 287739 | 87944 | 486764 | 375683 | 382432 | new |
| 1024 | 256 | 1 | - | 552000 | 133000 | 924000 | 685000 | 704600 | [ACR20] |
| 1024 | 256 | 2 | 511.19 | 310154 | 99371 | 521400 | 409525 | 415721 | new |

Table: pub: size of $p$; priv: size of the keyspace; DH 1: group action evaluation, DH 2: group action evaluation and public key validation; Mcyc millions of cycles on a 3GHz Intel Xeon E3-1220 v5 (Skylake) CPU with Turbo Boost disabled; "M" multiplications; " S " squarings; "a" additions; "1, 1, 0 " and " $1,0.8,0.05$ " combinations of $\mathbf{M}, \mathbf{S}$, and $\mathbf{a}$.

## Summary

## CTIDH

- New keyspace for CSIDH,
- New constant-time algorithm to evaluate the group action in CSIDH,
- Formalization of atomic blocks to compute the isogeny group action,
- constant-time verification using valgrind,
- speed records,

Find the article and the code at
https://ctidh.isogeny.org/

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